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We investigate experimentally if an option to obtain free information can disadvantage a 
player, relative to when information is unavailable. In the Ultimatum game, the Responder 
chooses a minimum acceptable offer and the Proposer decides at the same time whether to 
obtain and use information about the minimum acceptable offer. We find that the option of 
using free information on average reduces Proposers’, and increases Responders’, payoff, but 
by less than predicted. This is due to the presence of Proposers who either refuse information 
or who use it in a self-servingly fair manner. Information changes the distribution of the 
surplus, and increases inefficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Can an option to obtain free information about other players’ actions be a disadvantage? In 
models of strategic decision problems the answer is affirmative: an informed and money 
maximizing player can be led to behave in a way that gives him a lower equilibrium payoff 
than that he would obtain, had he been uninformed, or able to commit to ignoring the 
information. Consider as an example a bargaining situation. If a player can get information on 
what demand for a surplus an opponent made, the player may decide to obtain the information, 
in order to condition his own demand on the opponent’s demand. But this may lead the 
opponent to make an aggressive demand such that the player gets less than if he had ignored 
the information. Numerous other examples can be found in Schelling’s book, The Strategy of 
Conflict (Schelling (1960)).   
   Of course, it matters if the opponent does not know with certainty whether the player has 
chosen to obtain the information or not; any such uncertainty can induce the opponent to act 
less aggressively than if he knew that his choice would be observed by the player in question. 
Moreover, even if the opponent is confident that the player has obtained the information, the 
player may decide to use the information to punish any aggressive behavior by the opponent. 
This could be the case if the player was motivated by fairness and reciprocity; the robust 
presence of these concerns has been motivated by numerous experiments; see e.g. Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999).  
 
   This  paper  investigates  experimentally  (i) whether players choose to acquire free 
information about other players’ actions before making their own decisions; (ii) how any 
acquired information is used; (iii) whether obtaining information backfires, i.e., does it lower a 
player’s payoff relative to when no information is available, and; (iv) how players’ decisions 
to acquire information or not reveals their (lack of) fairness concerns. Related literature is 
described and discussed in Section 5.  
    
  2   We use as a workhorse the well-known Ultimatum game.
2 Responders choose Minimum 
Acceptable Offers (MAOs). An MAO defines the lowest offer the Responder accepts; any 
offer below the MAO is rejected and is otherwise accepted. In the Baseline game, the 
Responder chooses an MAO and at the same time the Proposer makes an offer. This game is a 
“strategy method” (Selten (1967)) implementation of the Ultimatum game, as used in other 
papers, e.g. Harrison and McCabe (1996). In the Information game, the Proposer decides 
whether to acquire information on the Responder’s MAO and the Responder simultaneously 
decides on his MAO. If the Proposer does not obtain any information, he makes an offer, as in 
the usual Ultimatum game. Note that the Information game is not the ‘reverse’ Ultimatum 
game, i.e., a game where the Responder moves before the Proposer: this would be the case 
only if the Proposer observed the Responder’s MAO with probability one before making an 
offer, and if the Responder knew this. In our Information game, the Proposer chooses whether 
to observe the Responder’s MAO or not, and the Responder, when choosing his MAO, does 
not know if the Proposer decided to observe the MAO or not.  
 
      The theoretical prediction for the Baseline game, assuming rationality and no fairness 
concerns, is that Proposers obtain the entire surplus and Responders choose the lowest MAO, 
i.e., accept any offer. The theoretical prediction for the Information treatment is that the 
Proposer i) chooses to become informed, and ii) uses the information to make a money-
maximizing offer. Given such Proposer behavior, Responders will choose the highest MAO. 
Thus the Responder gets the lion’s share of the surplus in the Information game. Information 
therefore backfires for Proposers who acquire and use it, but benefits Responders, relative to 
the situation where the Proposer is uninformed about the Responders’ MAOs.  
    
      It is, however, well known that fairness concerns can cause behavior to deviate from a 
theoretical prediction based on selfishness. Fairness is a systematic and robust finding in 
numerous experiments; see e.g. Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In our experiment, a Proposer who 
desires an equal distribution of the surplus, and who is unwilling to offer more than one-half, 
is called a fair Proposer. This Proposer will avoid using information. Other Proposers may be 
                                                 
2  In the Ultimatum game, two players, a Proposer and a Responder, can share a surplus. The Proposer first makes 
an offer to the Responder, who, after observing the offer, accepts or rejects the offer. If the Responder accepts the 
offer the Responder receives the offer and the Proposer receives the remaining share. In case the Responder 
rejects the offer, each player receives zero.  
  3willing to use information, in order to exploit Responders who want little; at the same time 
these Proposers may be unwilling to accommodate Responders who want a lot. We call these 
self-servingly fair Proposers: they are willing to use information to treat others unfairly, but 
not willing to be treated unfairly by other people. A fair Responder will reject offers smaller 
than .5. By considering a subject’s behavior in both the Proposer and Responder role, we can 
see whether subjects display fairness concerns consistently in both roles. 
 
   Our results are as follows. In the Baseline, our results resemble those already found in the 
literature: Proposers lower their offers over time, and Responders adjust by lowering their 
MAOs. In the Information  treatment, a notable proportion of Proposers do not acquire 
information, and among these almost all offer one-half (fair Proposers). The proportion of 
Proposers who obtain information is, however, increasing over time. Responders’ MAOs are 
significantly higher in the Information treatment than in the Baseline. Information-acquiring 
Proposers either use information to maximize money earnings, or in a self-servingly fair 
manner, as described above, i.e., they only invoke a fairness norm against greedy Responders, 
but take advantage of Responders who are less demanding. 
   To find out if information backfires for Proposers, we compare the distribution of the surplus 
in the two treatments. The Proposers’ share of the surplus in the Information treatment is 
smaller than in the Baseline. Thus information backfires, but by less than that predicted: 
fairness concerns among some Proposers make them refuse to obtain information, or if they 
do, they use the information in a self-servingly fair way. Responders are better off in the 
Information than in the Baseline. Since many Proposers use information to set offers equal to 
MAOs, Responders can successfully increase their MAOs, but not as much as theoretically 
predicted. The rate of disagreement is smaller in the Information treatment than in the 
Baseline. This can be ascribed to the Proposers who acquire information and make offers 
exactly equal to Responders’ MAOs. Thus information alters the distribution of the surplus, 
and increases the social surplus. 
 
      In sum, we find heterogeneity among our subjects. Some subjects choose not to use 
information, even with the opportunity to do so at no cost, and this behavior can be interpreted 
as due to fairness concerns. Among those who acquire information, a notable proportion uses 
it in a self-servingly fair manner. Both factors constrain the extent to which information 
  4backfires. Needless to say, our results are obtained in a stylized economic context. Future 
research should investigate whether information backfires in richer economic situations.  
 
      The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the theoretical 
predictions. Section 3 describes the experimental design. The results are presented in Section 
4. In Section 5 we relate our investigation and findings to the existing literature. Section 6 
concludes. The instructions are contained in the Appendix.  
 
2. Theoretical Predictions 
 
We first describe our games and give some theoretical predictions.  
 
2.1 The Baseline and Information games 
 
We assume the Proposer can make n offers, denoted o1, o2,…,on, with 0 < o1 and on < 1. The 
Responder has n feasible Minimum Acceptable Offers (MAOs), i=  1,…,n, where MAO i 
rejects any offer ok with k < i and accepts the offer otherwise.   
 
The Baseline game: In the Baseline game, the Proposer makes an offer and the Responder 
simultaneously chooses an MAO.  If the Proposer's offer equals or exceeds the Responder's 
MAO, the Responder receives the offer and the Proposer receives the remaining share. If the 
offer is below the MAO, each player gets zero.  
 
The Information game: In the Information game, the Responder chooses an MAO, as before. 
The Proposer simultaneously decides whether to obtain information about the Responder’s 
MAO. Information is available at no cost. The Proposer then makes an offer, and the 
Responder accepts or rejects the offer in accordance with the chosen MAO. If the Proposer's 
offer equals or exceeds the Responder's MAO, the Responder receives the offer and the 
Proposer receives the remaining share. If the offer is below the MAO, each player gets zero.  
   A strategy for the Proposer in the Information game consists of 1) a decision of whether to 
obtain information about the Responder's MAO or not, and 2) an offer. Note that the strategy 
of not obtaining information about the MAO and making some offer is, formally, the same as 
  5the strategy of obtaining information but then making the same offer regardless of the 
Responder's MAO, i.e., not to condition decisions on the obtained information. 
 
   Remark: As was already mentioned in the Introduction, the Information game is not the 
‘mirror image’ of, or the ‘reverse’ Ultimatum game. In such a game, the Responder would 
move first, choosing an MAO; the Proposer would then observe the MAO, and the Responder 
would know this. But in the Information game the Responder chooses her MAO at the same 
time as the Proposer decides whether to observe the MAO or not, and hence the Responder 
does not, at the  time where he decides on an MAO, know whether the Proposer will observe 
the chosen MAO or not.  
 
2.2 Theoretical predictions for the Baseline and Information Games 
 
The Baseline Game: The Baseline Game has many Nash equilibria. In fact, any strategy pair 
(oi, MAO i), where i=1,…,n, is a Nash equilibrium. This follows because given the 
Responder’s choice of MAO i, the Proposer’s offer, oi, is optimal. And, conversely, given the 
Proposer’s offer oi, the Responder’s choice of MAO i is optimal.  But note that so is any MAO 
1,…,i-1: They all accept the offer oi, and earn the same payoff. Indeed, MAO i weakly 
dominates the other MAOs.  This gives us the following, well-known result: 
 
Proposition 1: The Baseline game has a unique perfect Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium, 
the Proposer makes the lowest feasible offer, and the Responder chooses the lowest feasible 
MAO. 
Proof: For the Responder, the lowest MAO, 1, weakly dominates the other MAOs. Thus in a 
perfect equilibrium the Responder assigns probability one to MAO 1, i.e., the Responder 
accepts any offer. Given this the Proposer has a unique best reply, which is to offer the 
smallest feasible share of the surplus. ■ 
 
Another way to justify the selection of the outcome described in Proposition 1 is to note that it 
is the unique strict Nash equilibrium.
3 We use Result 1 as the basis for our: 
 
                                                 
3  Since the lowest feasible offer, o1, is strictly positive. 
  6Hypothesis 1: In the Baseline game, the Proposer offers the smallest share of the surplus to 
the Responder. The Responder chooses the lowest feasible MAO. 
 
The Information game: Define the Money Maximizing Proposer strategy (MM) to be the 




Fact: The MM strategy weakly dominates any other Proposer strategy. 
Proof: Fix an arbitrary MAO. The MM strategy earns a payoff against this MAO that is at 
least as high as can be obtained from any other Proposer strategy (and, for some MAOs, 
strictly higher). ■ 
 
It follows that any Nash equilibrium where the Proposer assigns positive weight to any 
strategy other than MM involves the use of weakly dominated Proposer strategies. Moreover, 
if the Proposer uses MM, then a best reply for the Responder is to use the highest MAO. Thus 
we have 
 
Proposition 2: In the Information game, there is a unique perfect equilibrium, where the 
Proposer uses the MM strategy and the Responder uses the highest MAO. Thus the Proposer 
makes the largest feasible offer to the Responder, who accepts this offer. The Responder 
consequently gets the largest feasible share of the surplus. 




Hypothesis 2: In the Information game, the Responder chooses the largest feasible MAO. The 
Proposer chooses strategy MM. 
 
If we compare the equilibrium payoff to the Proposer in the Baseline and Information 
treatments, it is clear that information is predicted to totally backfire for Proposers: In the 
                                                 
4  Formally, MM is the strategy that makes offer oi when observing MAO i. 
  7Baseline they get the entire surplus, but in the Information treatment they get essentially zero. 
Conversely, information is predicted to benefit Responders.  
 
The above results are derived from a static model that assumes rationality (and self-interest). 
But rather than ‘jumping’ straight to the equilibrium, real–life decision makers may, as they 
learn by trial-and-error what behavior is appropriate, slowly change their behavior. An 
evolutionary model can be appropriate in capturing such processes (see Weibull (1995)). We 
refer the reader to Poulsen (2004), where an evolutionary model is constructed for a situation 
closely related to the one studied here. The predictions of this evolutionary model are similar 
to those presented here.  
 
3. Experimental Design 
 
3.1 Logistics  
 
The experiments took place in summer 2003, in the experimental economics computer 
laboratory at the European University Viadrina, Germany. A total of 80 subjects, with eight 
subjects in each session, participated in a total of ten sessions. Subjects were recruited by 
email from a database of potential subjects, mostly economics undergraduates. None of these 
subjects had prior experience in the same experiment. Five sessions were conducted for the 
Baseline treatment, and five sessions were conducted for the Information treatment. The 
experiment consisted of 25 rounds of the Ultimatum game, with randomly matched co-players, 
to provide subjects with a chance to assess and adjust their strategies (as done in other 
experiments, e.g. Morgan and Várdy, 2004). 
   At the top of the screen, subjects were informed of the round, and their participant number. 
Subjects were given feedback on all their decisions and those of their co-player, as well as on 
the outcomes for both roles, including the role allocated to them at the end of each round. 
Earnings for the experiment depended on one randomly chosen winning round. Subjects were 
informed of the winning round only at the end of the experiment. 
   Every subject read the instructions before completing a control questionnaire. They were 
only allowed to begin after the experimenters had checked the answers to these control 
questions. In the event of any incorrect answers, explanations were given individually. Apart 
  8from the instructions and questionnaires, the experiment was fully computerized. The 
instructions were in German; the English translations are in the Appendix. Each individual 
computer terminal in the laboratory was partitioned, preventing subjects from seeing each 
another’s computer screens, and communicating by means of visual signals. No verbal 
communication was allowed. At the end of the experiment, the computer informed subjects of 
their winnings in addition to the 5 Euros show-up fee. Subjects could earn a minimum of 5 
Euros and a maximum of 20 Euros. Each session lasted 1 - 1.5 hours. 
 
3.2 The Baseline 
 
In the Baseline treatment, a subject was in each round randomly matched with another subject. 
Each subject decided on how much of 20 Euros to offer as Proposer, and the MAO used as 
Responder. Offers and MAOs were constrained to fractions .25, .5, or .75 of a 20 Euros 
surplus. We used the strategy method (Selten (1967)): Subjects made choices in the Proposer 
and Responder role before knowing which role they would be allocated to. They were 
informed that they faced an equal chance of being allocated to either role. 
 
3.3 The Information Treatment 
 
In the Information treatment, a subject again chose an MAO for the Responder role and as 
Proposer he could again chose an unconditional offer as in the Baseline treatment. The 
Information treatment differed by the availability of an additional Proposer strategy, called 
‘Option’. By choosing Option a subject first indicates the maximal offer he is willing to make 
as Proposer. This is the offer limit, and the feasible values are .25, .5, or .75. Then, given the 
Responder’s MAO, once the Proposer has chosen an offer limit the computer makes the offer 
that maximizes the Proposer’s money payoff as long as the Responder’s MAO does not 
exceed the offer limit. If the Responder’s MAO exceeds the offer limit, each person earned 
zero. As already mentioned, in addition to the Option strategy, the Proposer strategies of 
simply making an unconditional offer (as in the Baseline) were feasible in the Information 
treatment. 
   Since there are three feasible offer limits, there are three Option strategies: Given any MAO, 
make the offer that maximizes monetary returns as long as this offer does not exceed j, where 
  9j=.25, .5, .75. Suppose, for example, that the Proposer chose Option and an offer limit of .75. 
Then if the Responder’s MAO is .25 (.5) [.75], the Proposer would offer .25 (.5) [.75], and the 
Responder accepts the offer. A person who as Proposer chooses offer limit .75 uses the Money 
Maximizing (MM) strategy (see Section 2), i.e., makes the offer that maximizes her monetary 
payoff relative to any MAO. A Proposer who chooses offer limit .5 offers .25 to a Responder 
with MAO .25, offers .5 to a Responder with MAO .5, but ends up in disagreement with a 
Responder using MAO 0.75. Finally, choosing offer limit .25 means making the offer of 0.25 
no matter the MAO. 
 
3.4. Discussion of Important Design Choices 
 
Obtaining and using information We combine a Proposer’s decision to obtain information 
with his decision on how to use this information. A subject who as Proposer decides to obtain 
information will use the information to make money maximizing offers as long as the 
Responder’s MAO does not exceed the offer limit.  A Proposer cannot, for example, first 
obtain information, and then make the offer of one-half regardless of the Responder’s MAO. 
But this behavior is the same as that of not obtaining information and unconditionally offering 
one-half, which is feasible in our experiment. 
 
‘Hot’ and ‘cold’ elicitation methods. We use the strategy method to elicit Proposer’s 
conditional strategies. We could alternatively employ a ‘hot’ procedure: The Responder 
chooses an MAO and at the same time the Proposer decides whether to become informed 
about the MAO or not. If he chooses the former option, the Proposer observes the chosen 
MAO and decides on an offer (otherwise he just makes an unconditional offer). This hot 
procedure has the advantage that an information-acquiring Proposer reacts to an actually 
chosen MAO (see the discussion in Roth (1995)). But the method does not give us data on 
how individual Proposers react to various MAOs. As we shall see later, the advantage of our 
cold procedure is that we can see how an information acquiring Proposer reacts to various 
MAOs, thus allowing us to measure his (lack of) fairness concerns. There is conflicting 
evidence on whether the strategy method induces the same behavior as the ‘hot’ method; see, 
for example, Brandts and Charness (2000), Brosig, Weimann, and Yang (2003). In a recent 
  10contribution by Oxoby and McLeish (2004), also studying an Ultimatum game, no significant 
difference between the two elicitation methods is found. 
 
Simultaneous versus sequential move protocols In our Information game the Responder 
chooses an MAO and the Proposer at the same time decides whether to condition his offer on 
the MAO or not. Suppose instead that the Responder first chose an MAO and then, knowing 
that the Responder had already moved but not knowing what MAO was chosen, the Proposer 
chose whether to become informed or nor. This is known as the positional order protocol 
(Rapoport (1997)). Would adopting this protocol make a difference? The usual answer is ‘no’: 
A situation where a player knows that an opponent has moved first, but the player does not 
know what the opponent did, is the same as a situation where the two move at the same time.  
But research has shown that even though an opponent’s move is unobservable, the fact that the 
opponent has already moved, can make a difference, relative to the simultaneous move game. 
This phenomenon is referred to as ‘virtual observability’. We refer the reader to Weber, 
Camerer, and Knez (2004) and to Güth, Huck and Rapoport (1998).   
   Weber et. al. investigate virtual observability in an Ultimatum game, and find some, albeit 
not overwhelmingly strong, evidence for virtual observability: When the Proposer decides on 
his offer before the Responder chooses an MAO, the Proposer tends to get a larger share than 
when both players move simultaneously. We do not know whether virtual observability plays 
a significant role in out context. But if it does, it should strengthen the extent to which 
information backfires: Responders would choose larger MAOs, and Proposers would be more 
likely to become informed.  
 




Table 1 and Figure 1 provide an overview of behavior in the two treatments. 
 
Baseline In the Baseline, offers and MAOs fall over time. Using the Wilcoxon test, mean 
offers in round 1 (.48) are significantly higher than in round 25 (.35) (z = -3.321, p = .001). 
  11The difference between MAOs in round 1 (.33) and round 25 (.29) is not significantly different 
(z = -1.387, p = .166). Initial MAOs are already close to theoretical predictions. 
 
Information treatment In the Information treatment, MAOs increase over time. Round 1 
MAOs are significantly lower in round 1 (.39) than in round 25 (.48) (z = -3.441, p = .0001). 
Mean unconditional offers, i.e., offers made by Proposers who do not obtain information, are 
not significantly different between round 1 (.49) and 25 (.54) (z = -1.414, p = .157). Most of 
the Proposers who make an unconditional offer choose to offer one-half.  
   The proportion of Proposers who obtain information increases from 37.5% in round 1 to 
65% in round 25. This is a significant difference (z = -3.051, p = .002). Across all rounds, the 
mean proportion of Proposers who chose to obtain information over all rounds is 58.5%. In 
round 1, the mean offer limit is .53, whereas in round 25 the mean offer limit is .56. This 
difference between mean offer limits in round 1 and round 25 is significant (z = -2,907, p = 
.004).   
   Figure 2 shows how the proportions of each offer limit evolve over time. We present this in 
blocks of five rounds for clarity and simplicity. The proportion of subjects using offer limit .5 
is at all times the highest, but is weakly decreasing. The proportion of subjects using offer 
limit .25 never exceeds .10. Finally, the proportion using offer limit .75 is weakly increasing 
over time. 
 
<Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 about here> 
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 
 
4.2 Does Information Backfire? 
 
How does the availability of information affect subjects’ earnings? The value of information to 
Proposers (Responders) can be measured by comparing Proposer (Responder) earnings in the 
Information treatment and in the Baseline. According to our theoretical predictions, the value 
of information to Proposers (Responders) is negative (positive): Proposers (Responders) lose 
(gain) surplus in the Information treatment relative to the Baseline.  
      When considering all encounters, including those that led to disagreement, the mean 
Proposer earning is .50 of the surplus in the Baseline, and .48 in the Information treatment. A 
  12Mann-Whitney U-test shows that the difference in means is significant (z=-4.452, p=.0001), 
while a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows that the distributions are different (z = 3.421, p 
=.0001). These significant differences can be explained by figure 3, which shows how 
distributions of Proposer and Responder earnings for each treatment. A larger proportion of 
Proposers earn the lion’s share of .75 in the Baseline than in the Information treatment, while a 
smaller proportion of Proposers earn .25 or .5 in the Baseline than in the Information 
treatment. Thus Proposers’ average earnings fall in the information game, relative to the 
Baseline.  
 
<Insert Figure 3 about here> 
 
   The mean Responder earning is .35 in the Baseline, and .43 in the Information treatment. 
This difference in means is significant (z=-9.829, p=.0001); and likewise the difference in 
distributions (z = 4.763, p = .0001). From figure 3, we see that a smaller proportion of 
Responders earn the larger share of .75 or fair share of .5 in the Baseline than the Information 
treatment, while a larger proportion of Responders earn .25 in the Baseline than in the 
Information treatment. This implies that Responders’ average earnings increase by going from 
the Baseline to the Information treatment. In sum, the value of information to Proposers is 
negative (.48 vs. .50), while positive for Responders (.43 vs. .35). These findings qualitatively 
match the theoretical predictions. 
   The social value of information can be measured by the difference in efficiency (rates of 
agreement) between Information treatment and the Baseline. The social value of information is 
predicted to be zero, since full efficiency is predicted in both treatments. The rate of agreement 
is .85 in the Baseline and .91 in the Information treatment. The social value of information is 
thus positive (.91 vs. .85).
5 This difference is significant at the 1% level (Mann-Whitney U-
test, two-tailed). Much as above, this can be explained by the fact that information allows 
Proposers to set offers equal to Responders’ MAOs, and by the fact that Responders do not 
raise their MAOs excessively, which, given Proposers’ offer limits, would provoke conflict.  
 
                                                 
5  If we only consider outcomes that led to agreement, the same pattern is seen: mean Proposer earning is .59 of 
the surplus in the Baseline, and .53 in the Information treatment. The mean Responder earning is .41 in the 
Baseline, and .47 in the Information treatment. 
  13   These results show that when information on the Responder’s MAO is available for the 
Proposer to use, some (but, as we have seen, far from all) Proposers pick it up, and use it to 
target Responders’ MAOs. Responders seem to understand this and raise their MAOs in 
response, but not by so much that they provoke conflict. Thus Responders get a larger share of 
the surplus and the rate of disagreement falls.   
 
4.3 Fairness and Self-Serving Fairness 
 
Why does a significant proportion of Proposers refuse to obtain information, and who do many 
Proposers who obtain information not use it to maximize money earnings? In this section we 




It is now well recognized that observations of behavior that deviates from theoretical 
predictions of models based on the self-interested homo oeconomicus can often be fruitfully 
attributed to individuals having social preferences i.e., they care not just about their own, but 
also about other players’ material payoffs and intentions (see e.g. Fehr and Schmidt (1999), 
and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)). Such preferences can give rise to fair behavior, i.e., 
minimizing the inequality between payoffs across players.
6 A fairness concerned person may 
refuse to obtain (and use) information because doing so may give him a small surplus.  
   To investigate whether some of our subjects display fairness concerns, we define a Proposer 
as fair if he does not obtain information and offers half the surplus. Let us motivate this: A 
subject who, in the Information treatment, as Proposer chooses not to obtain information and 
makes an offer of one-half could have chosen to obtain information and choose offer limit .5. 
By not doing so reveals that this Proposer prefers to offer .5, rather than .25, to a Responder 
known by the Proposer to be using MAO .25. Thus the subject is genuinely fair, and does not 
just appear to be fair. 
    Table 2 shows the distribution of unconditional offers and MAOs in both treatments, over 
all 25 rounds, as well as the offer limits for the Information treatment. 46.5% of Proposer 
                                                 
6 A related important class of behavior is reciprocal behavior, whereby kind (unkind) behavior of other people is 
reciprocated with similar kind (unkind) behavior. See e.g. Rabin (1993). 
  14behavior was fair in the Baseline, while in the Information treatment 28.6% of Proposer 
behavior was fair. 
   A Responder who rejects any offer less than that leading to the equitable outcome, i.e., uses 
MAO .5, can likewise be categorized as a fair Responder.
7 For Responders, 30.0% of MAOs 
were .5 in the Baseline, and 63.9% of MAOs were .5 in the Information treatment.  
  In Andreoni and Miller’s (2002) dictator game experiments, 16.3 % of behavior was found to 
be what they call “strictly fair” (which we call ‘consistently fair’, see below), i.e., dictators 
who, across all decisions, consistently maintained strict equality of payoffs between co-player 
and self. Using our data, we can define a subject as consistently fair if he is fair as both 
Proposer and Responder. In the Baseline, 17.9% of behavior in all rounds was consistently 
fair. In the initial round, 27.5% of behavior was consistently fair. This decreased to 12.5% in 
the final round. In the Information treatment, 18.7 % of behavior was fair. In the first round 
27.5% of behavior was consistently fair, and this decreased to 20% in the final round. We thus 
find a notable proportion of (consistent) fairness among our subjects. Moreover, the frequency 
of fair behavior is similar to those found in the existing literature. 
    
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
4.3.2 Self-serving fairness 
 
Many Proposers chose to obtain information, but they did not use the information to maximize 
money earnings; they refused to offer more than half of the surplus, while offering less to a 
Responder accepting less – that is, they chose offer limit .5. We define a Proposer as self-
servingly fair if he chooses to acquire information and sets an offer limit of .5. Self-serving 
fairness differs from fairness in that the subject as Proposer prefers to offer less than .5 if the 
Responder will accept such an offer, i.e., if the Responder’s MAO equals .25. A fair Proposer, 
on the other hand, offers half of the surplus even if he knows that the Responder will accept 
less. Let us also define a subject as consistently self-servingly fair if he, in addition to being 
self-servingly fair as Proposer, chooses MAO .5 as Responder.  
                                                 
7   A fair Responder could alternatively be defined as someone who, in addition to offers below .5, would refuse 
offers above .5. In this experiment, however, we only allow for monotonic Responder strategies (see e.g. Güth 
and Huck (1997)). 
  15      Table 2 shows that in the Information treatment 34.9% of Proposer behavior was self-
servingly fair, as opposed to the 28.6% of Proposer behavior that was fair. 28.0% of behavior 
was consistently self-servingly fair. This number exceeds the frequency of consistently fair 
behavior (18.7%) in the Information treatment. 
     All in all, our data for the Information treatment shows that different fairness norms are in 
use: Some people are fair and others are self-servingly fair. A notable proportion of 19.9% act 
as Proposers in accordance with money maximization (the strategy ‘MM’ mentioned in section 
2).  
 
4.4 Expected Payoffs - Do subjects “play Nash”? 
 
In this section we consider how well the different strategies perform against the empirical 
distribution of strategies. Table 3 shows, for each treatment, the expected payoff to the various 
Proposer and Responder strategies against the empirical distribution of outcomes in that 
treatment. In the Information treatment, for example, the expected payoff earned by a Proposer 
obtaining information and choosing offer limit .75, i.e., playing MM, is .59.
8
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
In the Baseline, the .25 and .5 offers perform almost equally well, and much better than the 
generous offer, .75. Indeed, the low offer of .25 performs best. MAO .25 earns a higher 
expected payoff than MAO .5
9, and MAO .75 earns almost nothing, since very few Proposers 
make offers that high.  
   In the Information treatment, among unconditional Proposer offers, the .5 offer fares much 
better than the other unconditional offer. This is due to the median MAO being .5. The last 
fact is also the reason why the Proposer strategies of obtaining information and choosing offer 
limit .5 and .75 perform almost equally well – there are few Responders who choose a MAO 
of .75. Unlike the Baseline, MAO .5 yields the highest expected payoff in the Information 
treatment. MAO .25 does not fare as well, since there are many Proposers who obtain 
                                                 
8  These expected payoffs give the performance of strategy against the empirical distribution of co-player 
strategies in the experiment.  
9 This is always the case, since MAO .25 weakly dominates the other MAOs.  
  16information about MAOs and who exploit a low MAO.
10 Setting an MAO of .75 is the 
theoretical prediction in the Information game, but it gives the lowest expected payoff.  Again, 
too few Proposers choose offer limit .75 to make MAO .75 optimal for Responders.   
   To summarize, in the Baseline subjects in the aggregate play optimally against each other. In 
the Information treatment, given the fact that most Responders choose MAO .5, most 
Proposers play almost equally optimally by either unconditionally offering .5 or using offer 
limit .5 or .75. Facing this Proposer behavior, most Responders play optimally by choosing 
MAO .5. Still, a notable proportion of Responders choose the lowest MAO of .25. Thus the 
property of aggregate Nash play is only partially present in the Information treatment. 
 
4.5 Other behavioral patterns: Risk Aversion and Altruism 
 
From Table 2 it can be seen that in the Information treatment some subjects made 
unconditional offers of .75 and chose a low MAO of .25, as Responders. This happened 4.2% 
of the time. Offer limits of.75 and MAOs of .25 were observed 8.9% of the time. Similarly, in 
the Baseline, subjects made offers of .75 and set MAOs of .25 2.3% of the time.
11 For 
example, one subject – out of the eight – in a Baseline session persisted in offering the highest 
possible offer of .75 in about half of the rounds, even in the final round. How can we explain 
this behavior? One explanation is that subjects seek to avoid disagreement, because of risk 
aversion. The behavior can also be attributed to (extreme) altruism. In our experiment these 
two explanations, fear of disagreement and altruism, are, however, confounded. 
 
                                                 
10 The Responders with MAO .25 perform better against Proposers who unconditionally offer .25, but there are 
not enough of those Proposers to outweigh the loss from meeting Proposers who obtain information and exploit 
the Responders by making low offers.  
11 Considering only behavior in one role, 4.3% of all offers made in the Baseline were .75 – counter to theoretical 
predictions of .25. Moreover, 31.1% of MAOs in the Information treatment were set at .25, while only 5.0% were 
set at .75. 
  175. Relationship with Existing Literature 
 
In this section we describe how our work relates to other contributions. 
 
5.1 The Curse of Information and the Self-Serving Bias 
 
We are not the first to show that information can have counter-intuitive effects in strategic 
situations. In bargaining, increasing information about players’ outside options can increase 
disagreement, and hence lower the social surplus, relative to a situation where outside options 
are private information. See Roth and Murnighan (1982), Camerer and Loewenstein (1993), 
and Knez and Camerer (1995). One mechanism through which this increase in disagreement 
takes place is known as the self-serving bias. This is the empirical observation that people tend 
to appeal to norms of fairness and equity that further their own self-interest (Babcock and 
Loewenstein (1997)). When information about opponent’s outside options is made available, 
multiple focal points arise: One focal point, which is present regardless of whether information 
about options is available or not, is “split the money surplus equally”. But when information is 
made available, the norm “split equally the surplus net of the outside option” becomes another 
candidate for focal point. Disagreement can arise whenever players fail to co-ordinate on the 
same focal point and make too aggressive demands.  
 
5.2 Information about Players’ Outside Options 
 
The experiment by Gehrig, Güth and Levinský (2003) is in several respects motivated by the 
same research goals as ours. They study an Ultimatum game with outside options. The 
Proposer's outside option (what the Proposer gets in case of disagreement) is commonly 
known. But only the Responder knows his outside option. The Proposer is either informed or 
not about the Responder's outside option prior to making his offer (unlike our experiment, the 
Proposer does not decide whether to acquire information). The Responder chooses an 
accept/reject decision for each possible offer. The second treatment variable is ‘transparency’, 
which refers to whether the Responder, before choosing her accept/reject decision, knows 
whether the Proposer has acquired information or not. 
  18   In spite of many common research objectives, there are important differences between their 
experiment and ours. First, as already mentioned above, in their set-up Proposers are 
exogenously informed or otherwise – no choice is involved. Second, the nature of information, 
when provided, is different: In their set-up, the Proposer is informed about the Responder's 
outside option, not about the accept/reject decisions he has made. Thus in their model even an 
informed Proposer is not sure whether an offer will be accepted or not. In our design, on the 
other hand, a Proposer who acquires information knows what the Responder's MAO is. 
Proposers consequently have more information in ours than in their design. Another important 
difference is that in our experiment there is no full transparency - Responders can never be 
sure whether the Proposer decides to become informed about the Responder’s MAO or not. 
 
5.3 Distinguishing between fairness and strategic reasoning in Ultimatum bargaining 
 
It is well-known that the generous offers observed in numerous Ultimatum game experiments 
(See Roth (1995) and Camerer (2003) for comprehensive surveys) can come about either 
because Proposers desire to make a substantial offer to the Responder (fairness) or because the 
Proposer fears that a low offer will be rejected by the Responder (strategic reasoning based on 
money maximization), or both. The literature has shown that fairness and material self-interest 
both matter. This insight has been obtained by comparing the behavior in the Ultimatum game 
with behavior in related games, such as Dictator and three-person Ultimatum games. We refer 
the reader to Camerer (2003, Ch. 2) for an overview of these results.  
      We shed light on the “fairness versus maximization” issue by investigating (i) whether 
Proposers would like to know what the Responder’s MAO is, and; (ii) what Proposers would 
do if they knew the Responder’s MAO. We use these insights to characterize the Proposer’s 
fairness concern or lack of it. A Proposer who wishes to maximize his money returns will 
obtain information and use it to best reply to the Responder’s MAO. And a Proposer who does 
not obtain the information is not money maximizing. Our results show that there is 
heterogeneity: Some Proposers are money maximizers, others are fair. There are also 
Proposers who act fairly in some situations, but act selfishly in others. We interpreted these 
subjects as self-servingly fair.  
   Our approach is related to Harrison and McCabe (1996) who seek to disentangle the fairness 
and maximization explanations by providing the Proposers with historical information about 
  19Responder' MAOs, and not just with information about Responders' accept and reject 
decisions. The idea is that such information can allow Proposers to fix their beliefs about the 
Responders' MAOs and this should move behavior closer to the equilibrium prediction: 
Proposers can see if Responders are on average willing to accept smaller offers than those 
made in the previous period, and this may 'help' Responders to see that they should be willing 
to accept any offer. Harrison and McCabe show that providing this kind of information does 
indeed bring behavior closer to the theoretical equilibrium. Thus their evidence is in support of 
maximizing behavior. The main difference between their and our approach is that they 
exogenously provide Proposers with historical information about Responders' strategies, 
whereas we allow Proposers to become informed about the Responders' strategies. 
 
5.4 Aversion to unfair game protocols 
 
One of our key results is that although information about Responders’ MAO is available free-
of-charge, and information allows a Proposer to achieve the highest monetary payoff given the 
Responder’s MAO, many Proposers refused to obtain the information. One possible reason is 
that by obtaining information, a Proposer in effect opts to become second mover (even though 
the Responder does not know this decision). The observed reluctance to obtain information 
can therefore be explained as an aversion to unfair game protocols. This interpretation is 
similar to the interpretation of results from numerous experiments with games with 
endogenous timing, in particular those studying oligopoly games (see e.g. Hamilton and 
Slutsky (1990) and Huck, Müller and Normann (2002), Güth, Müller and Spiegel (2003) and 
Fonseca, Huck and Normann (2004)). 
   In these games players (firms) first decide when to produce and then quantities are chosen 
conditional on information about the opponent's move. If players move at the same time, a 
Cournot game is played. If, on the other hand, one player moves before the other, a 
Stackelberg game is played. While most theoretical models predict the Stackelberg structure, 
the experiments quoted above predominantly observe the Cournot structure emerging. 
Moreover, whenever the Stackelberg structure does emerge, the Stackelberg leader is less 
aggressive than predicted; the Stackelberg followers “reward” co-operative leaders, and 
“punish” those leaders who seek to exploit their first-mover advantage. A plausible 
  20explanation is that players resist being followers in the Stackelberg game because of an 
aversion to disadvantageous move protocols, i.e., players dislike being second-movers. 
   In an endogenous move game, the move protocol is endogenous, but a second-mover always 
perfectly observes the first-mover’s choice; thus information is exogenous and perfect, and 
this is common knowledge. In our game, on the other hand, the move protocol is exogenous 
(both move at the same time), but the extent to which the Proposer observes the Responder’s 
MAO is endogenous. In spite of these differences, our experiment comes to much the same 
conclusion: Many Proposers dislike acquiring information about the Responder’s MAO, 
because it makes them vulnerable to Responders who choose high MAO. In both game 
situations, fairness concerns constrain money maximizing behavior. 
 
5.5 Costly Information Acquisition 
 
In our experiment, the Proposer could, free-of-charge, condition his offer on the Responder’s 
MAO. We conjecture that if information was costly, fewer Proposers would buy the info, and 
information would backfire less. This is shown theoretically in Poulsen (2004). Morgan and 
Várdy (2004) explicitly consider the effects of varying the cost of information in a Stackelberg 
game. The follower can, at a cost, become informed about the Leader’s choice. They find that 
when information is cheap, most Followers buy the info and, the Stackelberg outcome occurs 
most of the time. When information becomes more expensive, fewer Followers buy it, and 
Leaders appear to foresee this, by choosing the Cournot output. Thus expensive information 
gives rise to the Cournot outcome. Thus cheap information backfires, while expensive 
information does not. Várdy (2004) provides a theoretical analysis of the Stackelberg game 




We experimentally investigate if an option to obtain free information can backfire – can it 
lower a player’s equilibrium payoff, relative to when he has no information? We use the 
Ultimatum game. The Responder chooses a Minimum Acceptable Offer (MAO) and, at the 
same time, the Proposer decides whether, at no cost, to condition his offer on the Responder’s 
MAO. Thus the Responder does not know whether the Proposer will obtain information or 
  21not. Nevertheless, a self-interested Proposer should obtain such information, since it allows 
him to set his offer at the Responder’s MAO. But this leads the Responder to choose the MAO 
that only accepts an offer of the entire surplus. Thus information about Responders’ MAOs is 
a disadvantage (advantage) for Proposers (Responders). Is this observed in practice? In our 
experiment information does indeed backfire for Proposers – but the magnitude of the 
disadvantage is moderated by fairness considerations. Fair-minded Proposers choose not to 
acquire information, and there are enough such Proposers to make it unattractive for 
Responders to choose high MAOs. There is also a sizeable proportion of Proposers who 
choose to acquire information but use it in a self-servingly fair manner: They refuse to make 
large offers but are ready to exploit Responders who accept small offers. Finally, a notable 
proportion of Proposers obtain information and make money maximizing offers. Our results 
have implications for economic situations where some players, before they decide, have the 
opportunity to obtain costless information about other players’ choices: Fairness concerns 
moderate the extent to which the information is obtained and used, and hence also moderates 
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Note: Text used only in the Information treatment are enclosed in square parentheses “[…]” 




You are about to participate in an experiment on decision-making. The experiment consists of 
25 rounds of the same task. You are paid whatever amount you have earned in the tasks, plus 
additional 5 Euros for participation. 
 
In each round, you will be matched with a different co-participant, and asked to decide on how 
to divide 20 Euros. You will not know who your co-participant is. Communication with other 
participants is not allowed in this experiment. 
  
There is a Proposer and a Responder in each round. A Proposer chooses what to offer to the 
Responder; a Responder chooses a minimum acceptable offer. If an offer chosen by the 
Proposer is equal to or higher than the minimum acceptable offer chosen by the Responder, 
then the Responder receives what is offered by the Proposer, and the Proposer receives the 
rest. However, if the offer chosen by the Proposer is lower than the minimum acceptable offer 
chosen by Responder, both will receive nothing for that round. 
 
At the time of decision, you will not know if you are a Proposer or a Responder. Whether you 
are Proposer or Responder has been randomly chosen by the computer, but you will only learn 
of this once both you and your co-participants have confirmed your choices – you will 
therefore have to make two decisions in every round: one as Proposer, one and as Responder. 
You will be a Proposer in as many rounds as you will be a Responder. As Proposer, you may 
offer your co-participant 1/4, 1/2, or 3/4 of the 20 Euros. As Responder, you must decide on a 
minimum acceptable offer of 1/4, 1/2, or 3/4 of the 20 Euros. You may do so by clicking on 
the correspondingly labeled buttons on the screen. Once you have decided, and if you are sure 
of your choices, please click on the Confirm button. If you wish to change any decision, click 
on the Cancel button and then the button corresponding to your new choice/s. You will not be 
allowed to change any choices made after the second click on Confirm. [However, instead of 
doing the above, you may let the computer set an offer for you by clicking on ‘Option’. After 
clicking on Option, you must decide on a minimum acceptable offer (if you have not already 
done so); in addition, indicate the largest offer you are willing to make (this is your 'offer 
limit'). Then, as long as your co-participant's minimum acceptable offer does not exceed your 
chosen offer limit, the computer will make an offer equal to the minimum acceptable offer. 
Otherwise, if your co-participant's minimum acceptable offer exceeds your chosen offer limit, 
the computer will then make an offer equal to your offer limit.] 
 
Once you have confirmed your choice, and when your co-participants have made their 
choices, the computer will match you with one co-participant. It will tell you the choices of 
both you and your co-participant, and the corresponding outcomes in the case where you are 
Proposer and in the case where you are Responder. It will finally tell you if you were allocated 
the role of Proposer or Responder in that round. 
 
  25Example 1: In a round, you chose to offer 1/4 as Proposer, and accept a minimum acceptable 
offer of 1/2 as Responder. Your co-participant chose to offer 1/2 as Proposer, and accept a 
minimum acceptable offer of 1/2 as Responder. If you have been allocated the role of 
Proposer in this round, both you and your co-participant receive nothing. If instead you have 
been allocated the role of Responder in this round, you receive 1/2, and your co-participant 
receives 1/2. 
 
[Example 2: In a round, you chose Option, an ‘offer limit’ of 1/2 as Proposer, and a minimum 
acceptable offer of 1/2 as Responder. Your co-participant chose to offer 1/2 as Proposer, and 
a minimum acceptable offer of 3/4 as Responder. If you have been allocated the role of 
Proposer in this round, you receive 0 and your co-participant receives 0. If you have been 
allocated the role of Responder in this round, you receive 1/2, and your co-participant 
receives 1/2.] 
 
You will be paid for only ONE randomly chosen round – known as the Winning Round. The 
Winning Round will be randomly selected by the computer. You will not know which round 
the Winning Round is until the end of the experiment. It is therefore very important that you 
choose carefully in each and every round. If you have understood the instructions, please fill in 
the questionnaire and raise your hand to call for the experimenter. If you need any 
clarification, now or during the experiment, you may also raise your hand. Many thanks and 
good luck. 
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Table 1: Mean behavior over time 
 
          
  Baseline   Information 
Round Offer  MAO    Offer  MAO  Info-users  Offer  Limit
1  .48 .33    .49  .39 .38 .53 
2  .39 .38    .59  .39 .43 .53 
3  .42 .36    .54  .41 .58 .50 
4  .43 .36    .50  .44 .43 .57 
5  .40 .36    .58  .43 .50 .58 
6  .44 .36    .54  .42 .48 .57 
7  .39 .34    .58  .44 .53 .56 
8  .37 .38    .57  .45 .48 .55 
9  .39 .38    .51  .42 .45 .60 
10  .44 .35    .53  .43 .55 .58 
11  .39 .34    .52  .43 .68 .57 
12  .36 .35    .53  .43 .63 .58 
13  .41 .35    .55  .46 .60 .55 
14  .38 .34    .45  .46 .63 .59 
15  .37 .36    .48  .44 .65 .60 
16  .39 .34    .44  .47 .68 .57 
17  .36 .31    .48  .44 .65 .58 
18  .39 .31    .54  .43 .65 .58 
19  .38 .29    .50  .44 .63 .57 
20  .35 .31    .50  .44 .65 .57 
21  .38 .29    .54  .44 .70 .57 
22  .37 .32    .44  .43 .68 .58 
23  .34 .30    .50  .44 .70 .57 
24  .34 .29    .46  .44 .70 .59 
25  .35 .29    .54  .48 .65 .56 
           
Total  .38775 .336    .51988 .43475 .585 .569231 
 
Note: Offer = unconditional offers; Info-users = proportion of subjects who obtain 
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Note: A block is five periods. L = Offer limit .25; M = Offer limit .5; H = offer limit .75 
 
 




















  29Table 2: Distribution of strategies 
 
      
   
Baseline  
                   MAO    
    .25 .5 .75  Total 
Offer .25 372 109  11  492 
 .5  283 179  3  465 
 .75  23 12  8  43 
 Total  678 300  22 1000 
      
Information treatment 
                                                      MAO   
   .25 .5 .75  Total   
Offer .25  27 17  4  48 
 .5  92 187  7  286 
 .75  42 31  8  81 
 Total  161 235  19  415 
      
Offer Limit  .25  3 24  10  37 
 .5  58 280 11 349 
 .75  89 100 10 199 
 Total  150 404  31  585 
 
 
Table 3: Expected payoffs earned by the various strategies 
 
        
   Baseline    Information 
   Offer MAO    Offer  Offer  Limit  MAO 
.25   .509  .388  .233  .233  .362 
.50   .489  .265  .475  .553  .478 
.75   .250  .032  .250  .590  .210 
 
Note: The table is read as follows: In the Baseline, a subject using MAO .5 earns 
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